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Abstract
This article evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust enforcement against the
exclusionary conduct of dominant firms through a Nash equilibrium model of research and
development (R&D) competition to create new products. In the two-firm model, whether one
firm regards the other firm’s R&D investment as a strategic complement or strategic substitute
turns on an increasing differences condition: whether the first firm’s incremental benefit of
increased R&D investment is greater if its rival’s R&D effort succeeds or if its rival’s R&D
effort fails. Antitrust prohibitions on pre-innovation exclusion and post-innovation exclusion are
found to be effective in different strategic settings: Preventing dominant firm exclusion of its
rival from post-innovation (pre-innovation) product market competition increases the overall
likelihood of industry innovation if the dominant firm’s best response function slopes upward
(downward) and is sufficiently steep, or if its rival’s best response function slopes downward
(upward) and is sufficiently steep. An antitrust prohibition on dominant firm exclusion of its
rival from R&D competition increases the overall likelihood of industry innovation if the
dominant firm regards rival R&D investment as a strategic complement.
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1.

Introduction
The antitrust concern with monopolization is not limited to prices; it also includes a

dominant firm’s suppression of new technologies, products, and business models. Two wellknown monopolization cases provide illustrations. At the start of the 21st century, Microsoft,
which was the monopolist of operating systems for Intel-compatible personal computers, was
found to have prevented nascent operating system competition by excluding Netscape’s browser
and Sun’s Java programming language. A half century before, the Lorain Journal newspaper
protected its monopoly on advertising by local businesses by excluding a radio station entrant. 1
This article evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust enforcement against
exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm through a Nash equilibrium model of research and
development (R&D) competition between a dominant firm and a rival to create new products.2
The article is concerned solely with incentives to innovate; it abstracts from the potential benefits
of antitrust enforcement in lowering (quality-adjusted) prices and increasing output in static
markets. In the model, R&D investment increases the prospects of innovation success but does
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and Competition Policy.
1

Baker (2013) discusses these cases and the antitrust treatment of exclusionary conduct generally.

2

For recent surveys of the extensive economic literature relating competition and innovation, see Gomellini (2013),
Shapiro (2012), Schmutlzer (2010), Baker (2007), and Gilbert (2006).
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not influence post-investment price competition in the event that both firms succeed.3 These
simplifications make transparent the role of strategic interactions that involve R&D investment.
In particular, the model demonstrates that enforcement actions that challenge preinnovation exclusion and enforcement actions that challenge post-innovation exclusion will tend
to be effective in different strategic settings.4 An antitrust prohibition on dominant firm exclusion
of its rival from post-innovation (pre-innovation) product market competition will tend to
increase the overall likelihood of industry innovation if the dominant firm’s best response
function slopes upward (downward) and is sufficiently steep, or if its rival’s best response
function slopes downward (upward) and is sufficiently steep. In addition, an antitrust prohibition
on dominant firm exclusion of its rival from R&D competition increases the overall likelihood of
industry innovation if the dominant firm regards its rival’s R&D investment as a strategic
complement (its best response function slopes upward).
The model also shows that whether one firm regards the other firm’s R&D investment as
a strategic complement or strategic substitute turns on an increasing differences condition:
whether the first firm’s incremental benefit of increased R&D investment is greater if its rival’s
R&D effort succeeds or if its rival’s R&D effort fails.5 Baker (2016) applies these results to

3

Aoki & Speigel (2010) specify a model with the same mathematical structure to study the innovation consequences
of pre-grant patent publication.
4

Pre-innovation product market exclusion by a dominant firm may involve conduct that raises its rival’s costs (input
foreclosure) or inhibits its rival’s access to the market (customer foreclosure). A dominant firm can also impede
post-innovation product market competition by its rival in the event that both firms innovate, as through
technological investments in product incompatibility; loyalty discounts; tying; locking-in customers through the sale
of complementary products; investments that raise buyer switching or search costs; or the creation of impediments
to a rival’s challenges to a firm’s misuse of intellectual property.
5

Other models of R&D competition also identify conditions under which a dominant firm treats rival R&D
investment as a strategic complement. For example, in a two-stage game with R&D investment in cost reduction
followed by Cournot competition, R&D efforts are strategic complements if the degree of spillovers is sufficiently
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identify observable factors that would suggest whether dominant firms are likely to regard rival
R&D as a strategic complement or strategic substitute and to evaluate whether antitrust enforcers
and courts should question a dominant firm’s claim that alleged exclusionary conduct enhances
its incentive to innovate by increasing its return to R&D investment.

2.

Model
2.1

Setup

In the model, two firms that sell differentiated products – a dominant firm and its rival –
compete to develop new or upgraded (next-generation) products by investing in R&D. Strategic
interaction is limited to R&D. R&D investments need not succeed, but greater R&D investments
make innovation success more likely. The dominant firm may employ exclusionary practices that
limit pre-innovation competition or create impediments to post-innovation competition, but the
rival may not do so.6
The model implicitly presumes that the firms make decisions during two periods, but
their interaction reduces to a one-stage game. In the first period, both firms invest in R&D that is
aimed at developing a new or next-generation product. Each firm’s investment affects its
likelihood of successful innovation, which in turn affects its profits. There are no spillovers from
one firm’s R&D to its rival.
large (Vives (2008), p. 455, n. 40). R&D efforts are also strategic complements in patent race models where the
game is log-supermodular (Vives, 2005), p. 454). On the other hand, Schmutzler (2013, pp. 482, 483; 2010, p. 386)
suggests that when innovation is cost-reducing, R&D investments are likely strategic substitutes for both firms in a
duopoly, absent spillovers.
6

In the model, the dominant firm and its rival also differ in two other ways: Exclusionary impediments to product
market competition increase dominant firm profits but reduce rival profits; and the dominant firm receives a higher
payoff than its rival when neither firm’s R&D investment succeeds.
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In the second period, uncertainty about each firm’s innovation success is resolved and the
firms receive payoffs. Payoffs do not vary directly with the level of investment but do vary with
whether innovation occurs (which is affected by investment). Under this simplifying assumption,
discussed more in Section 3.1, each firm has only one possible way to innovate.
The dominant firm is designated firm 1; its rival is designated firm 2. Each firm chooses
R&D investment level Ii, for i = 1, 2. Its costs of R&D investment are Ci = C(Ii), with Cii > 0 and
Ciii > 0. (The subscript i indicates differentiation with respect to Ii.) Any costs of impeding
competition through exclusionary conduct are included in C1 and do not vary with I1.
Each firm’s probability of successfully innovating depends solely on the level of its R&D
investment: qi = qi(Ii). By assumption 0 < qi < 1, qii > 0, and qiii < 0, for i = 1, 2. One concern of
the Schumpeterian growth literature – the possibility that a firm’s likelihood of successful
innovation depends on the extent to which its current technology lags that of its rival – could lie
behind differences between the functions q1(I1) and q2(I2), but those relationships are not
modeled.
The second period is characterized by four possible states of the world: Both firms may
succeed in innovating; neither may succeed in doing so; only the dominant firm may succeed; or
only the rival may succeed. The payoffs to the firms may be interpreted as the discounted present
value of a future profit stream, and the terms profit and payoff are used interchangeably.
The payoffs in each state of the world and the ex ante probabilities of achieving each are
summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Πijk represents payoffs to firm i in state of the world (j,k), where j
indicates whether the dominant firm succeeded (s) or failed (f) in its innovation efforts and k
similarly indicates whether the rival succeeded or failed. All payoffs are non-negative.
Table 1
5
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Payoffs in Each State of the World
(Firm 1, Firm 2)

Firm 2 succeeds

Firm 2 does not succeed

Firm 1 succeeds

Π1ss(δ), Π2ss(δ)

Π1sf, Π2sf

Firm 1 does not succeed

Π1fs, Π2fs

Π1ff(θ), Π2ff(θ)

Table 2
Probability that Each State of the World Arises
Firm 2 succeeds

Firm 2 does not succeed

Firm 1 succeeds

q1q2

q1(1-q2)

Firm 1 does not succeed

(1-q1)q2

(1-q1)(1-q2)

Payoffs when both firms innovate (the (s,s) state of the world) depend on exclusionary
impediments to post-innovation competition δ. This parameter increases as exclusionary
impediments are removed. A lessening of exclusionary impediments to post-innovation
competition reduces dominant firm profits (Π1ssδ(δ) < 0, for all δ) and increases rival profits
(Π2ssδ(δ) > 0, for all δ). These assumptions rule out strategies in which the dominant firm
discourages rival investment in R&D by committing to aggressive post-innovation competition.7

7

When a dominant firm can employ exclusionary strategies, the removal of exclusionary impediments enhances
product market competition by improving the ability of rivals to contest the market, which increases the rival’s
rewards. By contrast, the Schumpeterian growth literature models increased product market competition as arising
from greater imitation, which reduces the rival’s rewards. (Shapiro, 2012, pp. 372-74). The Schumpeterian
literature also addresses two issues not explicitly treated here: the influence of the discrepancy between the
technology of a laggard and the leader on each firm’s incentives to invest in R&D (Aghion, Bechtold, et al. (2014);
Athey & Schmutzler (2011)), and the potential erosion of the distinction between policies that foster pre-innovation
competition and policies that foster post-innovation competition when firms engage in successive rounds of
innovation (Segal & Whinston (2007)).
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When neither firm innovates (the (f,f) state of the world), the firms compete in price with
existing products. Payoffs depend on the exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation product
market competition θ, which increases as impediments are removed. By assumption, a reduction
in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition lessens dominant firm profits
(Π1ffθ(θ) < 0, for all θ), increases rival profits (Π2ffθ(θ) > 0, for all θ), and lowers aggregate
industry profits (Π1ffθ(θ) + Π2ffθ(θ) < 0, for all θ). In addition, pre-innovation profits are greater
for the dominant firm (Π1ff(θ) > Π2ff(θ), for all θ). These assumptions build in an Arrow
replacement effect, by which the dominant firm has a greater opportunity cost of innovation than
the rival because innovation cannibalizes the dominant firm’s greater pre-innovation profits.
Each firm is assumed to profit (individually) from innovation. Hence, Π1ss(δ) > Π1fs and
Π2ss(δ) > Π2sf for all δ; Π1sf > Π1ff(θ) and Π2fs > Π2ff(θ) for all θ; Π1sf > Π1fs and Π2fs > Π2sf; and
Π1ss(δ) > Π1ff(θ) and Π2ss(δ) > Π2ff(θ) for all δ and θ.
The assumption that innovation is profitable for each firm individually implies that
aggregate profits are greater when both firms innovate than when neither succeeds in doing so
(Π1ss(δ) + Π2ss(δ) > Π2ff(θ) + Π1ff(θ) for all δ and θ). When both firms succeed, moreover,
competition is assumed to reduce aggregate profits relative to the outcome in which only one
firm succeeds in innovating, so (Π1sf + Π2sf) > (Π1ss(δ) + Π2ss(δ)) > 0, and (Π1fs + Π2fs) > (Π1ss(δ)
+ Π2ss(δ)) > 0, for all δ.8 Aggregate industry profits are also assumed to be greater if either firm
successfully innovates than if neither does so, so (Π1sf + Π2sf) > (Π1ff(θ) + Π2ff(θ)) > 0 and (Π1fs +
Π2fs) > Π1ff(θ) + Π2ff(θ) > 0, for all θ.
The assumptions with regard to the effects of δ and θ on payoffs collectively define a
competition policy intervention against exclusionary conduct broadly: any public policy that
8

This assumption restricts the extent to which post-innovation product differentiation expands the overall market.
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reduces dominant firm payoffs and increase rival payoffs in the pertinent state of the world (preor post-innovation) in which both compete with same-generation products.9 When exclusionary
conduct would affect both pre-innovation and post-innovation competition, the same policy may
be regarded as simultaneously affecting δ and θ. The model’s simple temporal structure avoids
analytical complications that are associated with sequential innovation, in which the future
product market competition that follows one round of product improvements would also
represent the pre-innovation product market competition that precedes the next round.
The payoffs allow each firm’s R&D investment decision to reflect a mixture of two
motives: One is the incentive to escape competition. Investment in R&D frees each firm from
competition with a finite probability: If a firm succeeds in innovating, it will avoid the state of
the world in which neither firm succeeds (in which the firms compete on price using existing
products), and it has a chance of avoiding the state of the world in which both firms succeed (in
which the firms compete on price with new products).
In addition, firm investment decisions reflect an incentive to innovate in order to capture
profits that arise from the increase in demand that is associated with bringing a new or nextgeneration product to market. The expected payoff for successful innovation is a probabilityweighted sum of the profit in the event that the rival firm does not also succeed and the smaller
profit in the event that both firms succeed.

2.2

Optimization and Equilibrium

9

By assumption, exclusionary conduct does not affect either firm’s profits in states of the world in which one firm
innovates while the other does not.
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During the first period, the two firms simultaneously choose investment levels to
maximize V1 and V2, the expected value of the dominant firm and rival respectively, where
V1 = q1(I1)(1-q2(I2))Π1sf + q1(I1)q2(I2)Π1ss(δ) + (1-q1(I1))(1-q2(I2))Π1ff(θ)
+ (1-q1(I))q2(I2)Π1fs – C1(I1); and
V2 = q2(I2)(1- q1(I1))Π2fs + q2(I2) q1(I1)Π2ss(δ) + (1- q2(I2))(1- q1(I1))Π2ff(θ)
+ (1- q2(I2))q1(I1)Π2sf – C2(I2).
The equilibrium values of I1 and I2 are determined by the simultaneous solution of the two first
order conditions
(1)

V11 = 0 = q11(1-q2)Π1sf + q11q2Π1ss – q11(1-q2)Π1ff – q11q2Π1fs – C11; and

(2)

V22 = 0 = q22(1-q1)Π2fs + q22q1Π2ss – q22(1-q1)Π2ff – q22q1Π2sf – C22 .

Second order conditions for a maximum (V111 < 0 and V222 < 0) are assumed to be satisfied.
Equilibrium investments are conditional on the extent of the exclusionary impediments that are
indexed by θ and δ; so these investments can be written Ii(θ,δ). The analysis in the remainder of
Section 2 will consider these impediments one at a time, so it will be convenient to write Ii(z),
where z represents θ or δ, as appropriate. (A third policy instrument – greater innovation
competition from challenging practices that raise rival R&D costs – is addressed below in
Section 3.2.)
The policymaker considers a competition policy intervention that alters z based on
whether the intervention increases the probability p that at least one firm succeeds, where p(z) =
q1 + q2 – q1q2.10 The policymaker does not care which firm innovates. The policymaker does not

10

In practice, the antitrust enforcement agencies would be expected to prefer that multiple firms succeed when
industry features like intellectual property rights or network effects do not make innovation competition winner-
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seek to identify the optimal policy intervention; instead it evaluates the consequences of a small
change in z for the likelihood of industry innovation.
By differentiating the definition of p(z), it is evident that a competition policy
intervention that raises z by a small amount will increase p if and only if dp/dz = q11(1- q2) dI1/dz
+ q22(1- q1) dI2/dz > 0. This equation formalizes the intuitive idea that a policy intervention may
benefit innovation if it leads to a substantial increase in one firm’s incentives to invest and its
resulting likelihood of success, without markedly reducing the other firm’s incentives to invest.
Each firm is assumed to be able to make an informed judgment about the way that its
rival’s investment level depends on the policy variables θ and δ, and to account for rival
responses in choosing investment levels and responding to competition policy interventions. The
latter responses will depend on the partial derivatives of the first-order conditions, which are set
forth in Table 3. The table indicates the signs of those derivatives, to the extent that they are
determined by prior assumptions.
Table 3
Partial Derivatives of the First-Order Conditions
Sign
V111 q111(1-q2)Π1sf + q111 q2Π1ss – q111(1- q2)Π1ff – q111 q2Π1fs – C111 < 0
V222 q222(1-q1) Π2fs + q222q1Π2ss – q222(1-q1)Π2ff – q222q1Π2sf – C222

<0

V112 q11q22[(Π1ss – Π1fs) – (Π1sf – Π1ff)] = q11 q22Δ

sign(Δ)

V221 q11q22[(Π2ss – Π2sf) – (Π2fs – Π2ff)] = q11q22Ψ

sign(Ψ)

take-all. It is reasonable to assume that agency preferences are lexicographic, however, in recognition of the many
studies that find that the social return to innovation substantially exceeds the private return and that identify
substantial social gains to new product introductions in individual industries.
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V11δ q11q2 Π1ssδ

<0

V22δ q1q22Π2ssδ

>0

V11θ –q11(1-q2)Π1ffθ

>0

V22θ –(1-q1)q22Π2ffθ

<0

In the table, the expressions for the cross-partial derivatives V112 and V221 are simplified
by defining two new variables – Δ and Ψ – that are related to the relative size of the payoffs in
various states of the world:
Δ = [(Π1ss – Π1fs) – (Π1sf – Π1ff)]; and
Ψ = [(Π2ss – Π2sf) – (Π2fs –Π2ff)].
To interpret Δ, note that (Π1ss – Π1fs) is the incremental benefit of innovation success to firm 1,
conditional on firm 2’s succeeding, while (Π1sf – Π1ff) is the incremental benefit of innovation
success to firm 1, conditional on firm 2’s not succeeding. Hence Δ is positive if and only if firm
1 gains more from innovation success conditional on firm 2’s succeeding than it gains
conditional on firm 2’s not succeeding. Similarly, Ψ is positive if and only if firm 2 gains more
from its innovation success in the event that firm 1 also succeeds than it gains in the event that
firm 1 does not succeed.
The first-order conditions (1) and (2) imply best response functions (reaction functions)
for the two firms: I1 = ρ1(I2) for the dominant firm; and I2 = ρ2(I1) for its rival. These functions
are assumed invertible, which allows the dominant firm’s reaction function to be written I2 = ρ1-
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1 1

(I ). Reaction function slopes are defined by differentiating functions of the form I2(I1) with

respect to I1:
(3) R1 = dρ1-1/dI1 = – V111/ V112 = –V111/(q11q22Δ); and
(4) R2 = dρ2/dI1 = – V221/V222 = – (q11q22Ψ)/V222.
The signs of the reaction function slopes are the same as the signs of Δ and Ψ,
respectively. If Δ and Ψ are both positive, each best response function is upward sloping
(strategic complements); if Δ and Ψ are both negative, each best response function is downward
sloping (strategic substitutes). If Δ and Ψ take on opposite signs, the best response functions
differ in the sign of their slopes.
Equation (3) implies that the dominant firm regards its rival’s R&D investment as a
strategic substitute (firm 1’s reaction function slopes downward), if and only if firm 1’s
incremental gains from innovating are greater when firm 2 does not succeed. Intuitively, a less
aggressive R&D investment strategy by firm 2 – a reduction in the second firm’s R&D
investment – lessens that firm’s likelihood of innovation success. If the incremental benefit of
R&D investment by firm 1 increases as a result – if Δ is negative – then the first firm will have
an incentive to invest more in R&D. Accordingly, when Δ is negative, firm 1 regards its rival’s
investment as a strategic substitute. Moreover, Δ is positive if and only if firm 1 regards its
rival’s investment as a strategic complement.
Equation (4) similarly implies that Ψ is negative if and only if firm 2 regards the
dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strategic substitute, and Ψ is positive if and only if firm 2
regards the dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strategic complement. Increasing differences
conditions appear because the R&D game is supermodular when V111 ≥ 0 and V221 ≥ 0.
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Reaction functions can slope in different directions, as Δ and Ψ need not have the same
sign. For example, two market features – a high market share for the dominant firm in the event
that both firms innovate, and a high likelihood that its rival would take a substantial fraction of
customers away from the dominant firm in the event that only the rival innovates – tend to
increase Δ while reducing Ψ, possibly leading the dominant firm to regard its rival’s R&D
investment as a strategic complement (Δ > 0), while the rival simultaneously views dominant
firm investment as a strategic substitute (Ψ < 0).11

2.3

Stability

The conditions for stability of the model’s Nash equilibria vary depending on whether the
reaction functions slope in the same or opposite directions. Local stability of the Nash
equilibrium of this two-player game with one-dimensional strategy spaces requires that
│R2│/│R1│ < 1, or equivalently, that │R1│ > │R2│. (See Vives, 1999, p. 51.) If R1 and R2 have
the same sign, the Nash equilibrium is stable if and only if D = V111 V222 – V112 V221 > 0, where D
is the determinant of the matrix of own- and cross-partial derivatives of the first-order condition.
If R1 and R2 have opposite signs, the Nash equilibrium is stable if and only if V111V222 + V112V221
> 0.

11

Baker (2016) provides examples of R&D competition that involved IBM, Microsoft, and Xerox where dominant
firm and rival reaction functions may have had different slopes, and Tombak (2006) suggests the same for Boeing
and Airbus’s investment decisions. In addition, suppose that an industry is characterized by what Athey &
Schmutzler (2011) term “weak increasing dominance” (a firm with low marginal cost invests more than its rival),
and the dominant firm is a technological leader. If the technological leader’s conduct is dominated by a desire to
extend its lead (because higher R&D increases the marginal benefit of investment net of cost) while the laggard’s
conduct is dominated by a desire not to take on the leader (because it obtains little marginal benefit from R&D
investment and has a high marginal cost), then the dominant firm’s reaction function would likely be upward sloping
and its rival’s reaction function would likely be downward sloping.
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Each stability condition requires that firm 1 have the steeper reaction function. D > 0
assures stability when reaction functions slope in the same direction. If reaction functions slope
in opposite directions, D > 0 necessarily holds, but D > 0 is no longer sufficient for stability. To
guarantee stability in that case, it is sufficient to assume that when reaction functions have
different signs, decreasing returns to scale in dominant firm investments in R&D are sufficiently
strong (C111 is sufficiently large) as to make V111 sufficiently large in absolute value to assure
that V111V222 > – (q11 q22)2ΔΨ > 0.12

2.4

Consequences of Policy Interventions for R&D Investment and the
Likelihood of Innovation

The policy interventions are analyzed using a comparative statics approach, which
presumes that those interventions are small. This assumption excludes interventions that would
alter payoffs so substantially as to change the sign of Δ or Ψ, and thus change the sign of a
reaction function. Propositions 1 and 2 show how increases in the policy variable z shift the two
firms’ reaction functions in a space in which I1 is on the horizontal axis. The policy variable will
be interpreted in turn as a reduction in impediments to pre-innovation competition (higher θ) and
a reduction in impediments to post-innovation competition (higher δ). Proposition 3 provides a
general comparative statics result for shifts in z. Proofs of all propositions in this article are
provided in an appendix.

12

If the stability condition for reaction functions that slope in opposite directions binds, however, it could limit the
absolute values of Δ and Ψ that would satisfy the condition for a policy intervention to increase the probability of
innovation.
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PROPOSITION 1 (Direction of the Shift of the Dominant Firm’s Reaction Function): An
increase in z shifts ρ1 [the reaction function of I1 with respect to I2] in the direction of
higher I1 if and only if –V11z/ V111 > 0.

COROLLARY: For ρ1, dI1/dz > 0 if and only if V11z > 0.

PROPOSITION 2 (Direction of the Shift of the Rival’s Reaction Function): An increase
in z shifts ρ2 [the reaction function of I2 with respect to I1] in the direction of higher I2 if
and only if –V22z/ V222 > 0.

COROLLARY: For ρ2, dI2/dz > 0 if and only if V22z > 0.

Propositions 1 and 2 imply that when the policy intervention reduces exclusionary
impediments to pre-innovation competition (greater θ), the dominant firm’s reaction function
shifts in the direction of greater I1 (as V11θ > 0), reflecting that firm’s increased incentive to
escape pre-innovation competition. The rival’s reaction function shifts in the direction of lower I2
(as V22θ < 0), reflecting its reduced incentive to escape pre-innovation competition.
If the policy intervention instead involves a reduction in exclusionary impediments to
post-innovation competition (greater δ), each reaction function shifts in a direction that is
opposite to the way that it shifts in response to a reduction in exclusionary impediments to preinnovation competition. With V11δ < 0, the dominant firm’s reaction function shifts in the
direction of lower I1, which reflects that firm’s lessened incentive to invest in R&D as a
consequence of the lower payoff that it will receive in the event that both firms innovate. With
15

Exclusion and R&D Competition

Draft: August 31, 2015

V22δ > 0, the rival’s reaction function shifts in the direction of greater I2, which reflects its
increased incentive to invest in R&D as a consequence of the greater payoff that it will receive in
the event both firms innovate.
The possibility that each reaction function may slope upward or downward generates four
cases. (The stability condition requires that firm 1 have the steeper reaction function (in absolute
value) in each case.) Figure 1 depicts the consequences for innovation of a reduction in
exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition for the case in which the dominant
firm’s reaction function is upward sloping and its rival’s reaction function slopes downward. In
the figure, the original reaction functions are depicted as thick solid lines; the reactions after the
policy intervention are depicted as thin lines; and the equilibrium outcome shifts upward (toward
higher I2).
As is evident from the figure, a reduction in exclusionary impediments to post-innovation
competition necessarily increases rival R&D investment, and its consequences for dominant firm
R&D investment are indeterminate. A reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation
competition operates in reverse, as though reaction functions shifted from the thin lines to the
thick ones in the figure. Accordingly, that policy intervention leads to a reduction in rival R&D
investment and an indeterminate change in dominant firm investment when the dominant firm’s
reaction function is upward sloping and the rival’s reaction function slopes downward.

16
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Figure 1
Comparative statics of reducing exclusionary impediments to postinnovation competition when ρ1 is upward sloping and ρ2 is downward
sloping
Rival R&D
Investment
Dominant firm
I2
reaction functions (ρ1)
(strategic complements)
New
equilibrium

Rival reaction functions
(ρ2) (strategic substitutes)

Initial
equilibrium

A policy intervention that reduces exclusionary
impediments to post-innovation competition
shifts reaction functions from the thick lines to
the corresponding thin lines

I1
Dominant Firm
R&D Investment

Table 4 summarizes what Figure 1 and similar figures for the other three cases show
about the consequences of a reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation
competition for each firm’s equilibrium investment. In the case that is evaluated in the final
column, both best response functions slope upward. Then each firm’s investment level may
either increase or decrease but they cannot simultaneously increase unless the policy intervention
has relatively little influence on the rival’s reaction function (in which case the new equilibrium
would be approximately determined by shifting the dominant firm’s reaction function along the
rival’s upward sloping reaction function).
The table indicates that a downward sloping reaction function for the dominant firm
guarantees that the dominant firm will increase its investment in R&D when exclusionary
impediments to pre-innovation competition are reduced. It also shows that a downward sloping
reaction function for the rival guarantees that the same policy intervention will lead the rival to
reduce its investment in R&D.
Table 4
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Comparative Statics of a Reduction in Exclusionary Impediments to Pre-Innovation Competition
R1 > 0 & R 2 < 0

R1 < 0 & R2 < 0

R1 < 0 & R2 > 0

R1 > 0 & R 2 > 0

I1

Indeterminate

Increases

Increases

Indeterminate

I2

Decreases

Decreases

Indeterminate

Indeterminate

R1 is the slope of the dominant firm’s reaction function (ρ1), and R2 is the slope of the rival’s reaction function (ρ2).

Table 5 provides a similar summary of the consequences of a reduction in exclusionary
impediments to post-innovation competition. That policy intervention shifts each reaction
function in the opposite direction from a reduction in exclusionary impediments to preinnovation competition, so it operates like a shift of the equilibrium outcome in the reverse
direction from the way that the outcome moved in the cases that are described in Table 4 (as is
evident, in the first column, for the case illustrated in Figure 1). Accordingly, the sign of each
determinate entry in Table 5 switches relative to the sign of the corresponding entry in Table 4.
The table indicates that a downward sloping reaction function for the rival guarantees that
the rival will increase its investment in R&D when exclusionary impediments to post-innovation
competition are reduced. It also shows that a downward sloping reaction function for the
dominant firm guarantees that the same policy intervention will lead the dominant firm to reduce
its investment in R&D.

Table 5
Comparative Statics of a Reduction in Exclusionary Impediments to Post-Innovation
Competition
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R1 > 0 & R 2 < 0

R1 < 0 & R2 < 0

R1 < 0 & R2 > 0

R1 > 0 & R 2 > 0

I1

Indeterminate

Decreases

Decreases

Indeterminate

I2

Increases

Increases

Indeterminate

Indeterminate

R1 is the slope of the dominant firm’s reaction function (ρ1), and R2 is the slope of the rival’s reaction function (ρ2).

Tables 4 and 5 suggest a relationship between the direction that reaction functions slope
and the innovation consequences of the two competition policy interventions. To ensure
conceptual clarity, the discussion will be couched in terms of the policy-maker’s selecting the
better intervention, ignoring the possibility that the available policy instruments could allow or
would require the policy-maker to combine its interventions.
Table 4 indicates that a reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation
competition stimulates dominant firm investment when the dominant firm’s reaction function is
downward sloping, and that rival investment cannot increase unless the rival’s reaction function
is upward sloping. Table 5 indicates that a reduction in exclusionary impediments to postinnovation competition stimulates rival investment when the rival’s reaction function is
downward sloping. It also shows that the dominant firm’s R&D investment cannot increase
unless the dominant firm’s reaction function is upward sloping.
The consequences of the two policy interventions for R&D investment are analyzed
analytically in Propositions 3 and 4. Proposition 3 derives the consequences of a small
competition policy intervention for investment by the two firms through a comparative statics
analysis.

19

Exclusion and R&D Competition

Draft: August 31, 2015

PROPOSITION 3 (Comparative Statics): The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are
increasing with marginal increases in z if the following conditions hold:

dI1/dz = [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/[V111V222 – V112V221 ]
= [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/D > 0; and
dI2/dz = [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/[V111V222 – V112V221 ]
= [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/D > 0.

Each policy intervention could simultaneously increase both firms’ R&D investment, in
which case the overall probability of innovation success necessarily rises. But in other cases,
each intervention may increase one firm’s R&D investment, which boosts its probability of
innovation success, while reducing the other firm’s R&D investment and thereby lessening its
probability of innovation success. Proposition 4 derives the conditions under which a small
policy intervention will increase the overall probability of innovation success. These propositions
confirm what is evident from Tables 4 and 5: Restrictions on the signs of the slopes of the
reaction functions are not sufficient to guarantee that policy interventions will benefit innovation;
the steepness of those slopes and the extent to which the intervention shifts reaction functions
also matter.
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PROPOSITION 4 (Conditions for Policy Interventions to Increase the Probability of
Innovation): A policy intervention that raises z by a small amount will increase p [the
probability that at least one firm succeeds] if and only if
dp/dz = q11(1-q2) [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/D + q22(1-q1) [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/D > 0.
COROLLARY 1: A reduction in exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation
competition (greater θ) will increase p if and only if
q11(1-q2) [q11(1-q2) Π1ffθV222 ] + q22(1-q1) [(1-q1) q22Π2ffθV111] >
q11(1- q2) [(q11 q22Δ) ((1-q1) q2Π2ffθ)] + q22(1-q1) [(q11 q22Ψ)( q11(1- q2) Π1ffθ)].
COROLLARY 2: A reduction in exclusionary impediments to post-innovation
competition (greater δ) will increase p if and only if
q1(q11)2(1- q2)(q22)2Π1ssδΔ + (q11 q22)2(1- q1)q2 Π1ssδΨ >
(q11)2q2(1- q2)Π1ssδV222 + q11(1- q1)(q22)2Π1ssδV111.
From Corollary 1, two sufficient conditions for a policy intervention that lessens
exclusionary impediments to pre-innovation competition to raise the likelihood of innovation can
be identified: The dominant firm’s reaction function has a sufficiently downward slope (Δ is
sufficiently negative); or the rival’s reaction function has a sufficiently upward slope (Ψ is
sufficiently positive). (These are not necessary conditions because the left-hand side of the
inequality can take on either sign.) The condition in the corollary will also be satisfied in the
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limit (regardless of the signs of Δ and Ψ) as q11 grows small: as the dominant firm’s likelihood of
innovation success becomes insensitive to its level of investment.13
Corollary 2 similarly implies two sufficient conditions for a policy intervention that
lessens exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition to raise the likelihood of
innovation: The dominant firm’s reaction function has a sufficiently upward slope (Δ is
sufficiently positive); or the rival’s reaction function has a sufficiently downward slope (Ψ is
sufficiently negative). (These are not necessary conditions because the right-hand side of the
inequality can take either sign.)
The sufficient conditions for a policy intervention that reduces exclusionary impediments
to pre-innovation competition to increase the likelihood of innovation (from Corollary 1 to
Proposition 4) suggest that a downward sloping best-response function for the dominant firm and
an upward sloping best-response function for its rival favor the success of that intervention in
increasing the aggregate likelihood of innovation. To provide an intuition, a firm’s non-strategic
response to the policy intervention (its response if the other firm’s investment level is held
constant) will be separated from its strategic response.
A policy intervention that limits pre-innovation product market exclusion will, in the first
instance (before accounting for strategic responses), encourage the dominant firm to invest more
in R&D in order to escape competition and encourage its rival to invest less by increasing its preinnovation profits and reducing its incentive to escape competition. The dominant firm will be
encouraged to invest even more in response to the investment decision of its rival, if the
13

It would also be satisfied if V222 is sufficiently large in absolute value and V111 is sufficiently small in absolute
value; but this possibility is inconsistent with the stability condition, which will fail as V111 approaches zero.
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dominant firm regards rival R&D as a strategic substitute. On the assumption that the dominant
firm does invest more,14 the rival’s non-strategic incentive to cut back on R&D will be dampened
or countered if it views the dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strategic complement, and
amplified if it views the dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strategic substitute. If the
dominant firm invests more, and its rival’s R&D investment increases or does not decline much,
the aggregate probability of R&D success may increase. In this way, the dominant firm’s
downward sloping reaction function and its rival’s upward sloping reaction function may work
together to support an increase in the overall likelihood of innovation.
For analogous reasons, the sufficient conditions for a policy intervention that reduces
exclusionary impediments to post-innovation competition to increase the likelihood of
innovation (from Corollary 2 to Proposition 4) suggest that an upward sloping reaction function
for the dominant firm and a downward sloping best response function for the rival favor the
success of that intervention. (Figure 1 depicts the case in which both occur.)
Intuitively, if we assume that the rival invests more,15 the dominant firm’s non-strategic
incentive to reduce R&D will be dampened or countered if it views its own R&D investment as a
strategic complement, and amplified if it views the rival’s R&D investment as a strategic
14

Aggregate incentives to innovate may increase even if the dominant firm invests less. This outcome may arise if
the rival regards the dominant firm’s R&D investment as a strong strategic complement, so long as the rival’s
strategic response is so substantial as to lead the rival to invest more and so long as the aggregate probability of
innovation is more heavily influenced by greater rival investment than by reduced dominant firm investment. The
intuition that is offered in the text emphasizes one of the sufficient conditions that are derived from Corollary 1 to
Proposition 4: that the dominant firm’s reaction function slopes downward. The intuition in this note emphasizes the
other sufficient condition: that the rival’s reaction function slopes upward.
15

Aggregate incentives to innovate may also increase even if the rival invests less. This outcome may arise if the
dominant firm regards its rival’s R&D investment as a strong strategic substitute, so long as the rival’s strategic
response is so substantial as to lead the dominant firm to invest more and so long as the aggregate probability of
innovation is more heavily influenced by greater dominant firm investment than by reduced rival investment.
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substitute.16 If the rival invests more, and the dominant firm’s R&D investment increases or does
not decline much, the aggregate probability of R&D success may increase.

3.

Extensions
3.1

Payoffs that Depend on R&D Investments

In the model that was discussed in Section 2, the payoffs to successful innovation do not vary
with the level of R&D investment. This assumption, which is tantamount to supposing that each
firm has only one possible way to innovate, is most plausible when firms are pursuing major new
products, substantial product upgrades, or drastic cost reductions. In these settings, firm payoffs
to R&D investment will likely be determined primarily by whether the R&D effort succeeds.
The assumption that the payoffs to successful innovation do not vary with the level of
R&D investment is less attractive for non-drastic cost reductions. Then firm payoffs will
depend in part on the way that cost reductions affect the oligopoly interaction in product markets,
which is not incorporated in the model. The assumption is also less attractive in some settings
that involve demand-enhancing (new product) innovation. These include the possibility that the
level of investment affects the magnitude of the quality improvement (in a vertical differentiation
model) or the proximity of new goods in product space (in a horizontal differentiation model). In
general, when payoffs to innovation success depend on R&D investments, the slopes of reaction
functions would continue to be influenced by the relative magnitude of payoffs in various states

16

For this reason, the antitrust policy application in Baker (2016) turns on evaluating the sign of the slope of the
dominant firm’s reaction function.
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of the world, as in the model that is set forth here; but additional factors that are not incorporated
in the model would also be expected to matter.
R&D spillovers may also lead the payoffs to innovation success to vary with the level of
R&D investment. If one firm’s R&D success benefits the other firm by increasing the
probability that the rival would also succeed, without changing the payoffs to innovation success,
the slopes of reaction functions would not change and the comparative statics results of
Proposition 3 would continue to apply.17 More generally, though, positive R&D investment
spillovers would also be expected to change the payoffs to innovation success, and, in
consequence, alter the way that firm R&D investments respond to reductions in exclusionary
impediments to product market competition in additional ways that are not captured by the
model.
On the one hand, the spillovers that are generated by a policy intervention that leads one
firm to increase its R&D investment would be expected to lower the marginal cost or increase
the marginal benefit of R&D investment by its rival, which would lead the rival to increase its
own R&D expenditures. On the other hand, the greater R&D investment by one firm would also
increase the likelihood that its rival’s R&D effort would succeed and reduce the likelihood that
the rival would succeed alone. This would be expected to discourage the rival from increasing
its R&D investment in response because it would reduce the rival’s ability to escape competition
by developing new products or lowering production costs, thereby lessening the rival’s expected

17

Even under this assumption, however, the conditions under which policy interventions increase the probability of
innovation (Proposition 4) would require modification to incorporate the interdependence in probabilities of
innovation success.
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payoffs to innovation success.18 If positive R&D spillovers are important, it would be necessary
to account for these possible additional dynamics to determine how firms alter their R&D
investments in response to policy changes that reduce impediments to product market exclusion.
3.2

Raising Rival R&D Costs

Dominant firms may also exclude innovation rivals by raising their R&D costs, as by
raising the price of inputs such as intellectual property rights. This possibility may be
incorporated into the model by assuming that antitrust enforcers have a third policy instrument
(σ) that has the effect of lowering the rival’s cost of R&D investment I2. A higher σ represents
reduced exclusion, which is consistent with the way that the other policy interventions are
signed.
To incorporate this possibility, the rival’s R&D cost function is assumed to take the form
C2 = C2(σ, I2), where C2σ < 0, C2σ2 < 0, C22 > 0, and C222 < 0. (Consistent with previous notation,
the subscript 2 identifies the partial derivative with respect to I2 (which also happens to be the
variable in the second position).) The assumption that C2σ2 < 0 recognizes that a competition
policy intervention that limits the ability of the dominant firm to raise its rival’s R&D costs will
lower the rival’s marginal cost of R&D investment.
This modification to the model does not alter the expression for the expected value of the
dominant firm (V1), and the expected value of the rival (V2) differs only in the form of the cost
function:

18

This discussion is concerned with the way that reductions in exclusionary impediments to product market
competition would alter R&D investments by the firms, not on the way that the presence of spillovers would alter
initial investment levels. Each firm’s equilibrium level of R&D investment before a policy intervention would differ
from the corresponding level in a model that does not allow for R&D spillovers because of the increased likelihood
that both firms would succeed and the reduced likelihood that either firm would succeed alone.
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V2 = q2(I2)(1- q1(I1))Π2fs + q2(I2) q1(I1)Π2ss(δ) + (1- q2(I2))(1- q1(I1))Π2ff(θ)
+ (1- q2(I2))q1(I1)Π2sf – C2(σ, I2).
Because the policy intervention parameter σ appears only in the rival’s cost function, the firstorder conditions are written as before, though with the C22 term in equation (2) defined
differently: as a partial derivative of the cost function C(σ, I2)). Comparative statics require
signing the partial derivatives V11 and V22 with respect to σ: V11σ = 0, and V22σ = – C2σ2 > 0.

PROPOSITION 5 (Comparative Statics): The equilibrium level of I2 necessarily
increases with marginal increases in σ; and the equilibrium level of I1 increases with
marginal increases in σ if and only if Δ > 0.

COROLLARY (Sufficient condition for a Policy Intervention that Reduces the Marginal
Cost of Rival R&D to Increase the Probability of Innovation): A policy intervention that
raises σ by a small amount will necessarily increase p if Δ > 0.

Proposition 5 and its corollary show that a competition policy intervention that reduces
the marginal cost of the rival’s R&D (greater σ) will necessarily increase rival investment, and
will increase dominant firm investment if and only if the dominant firm regards rival investment
as a strategic complement (Δ > 0). In the latter case, the overall probability of innovation
necessarily increases. If the dominant firm instead regards rival investment as a strategic
substitute, the rival will invest more in R&D; but the dominant firm will invest less. Under such
circumstances, the effect on the overall probability of innovation success will depend on the
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relative magnitudes of these effects and on the way that variation in each firm’s R&D investment
affects its probability of innovation success.

4.

Conclusion

In the model of research and development competition that is set forth in this article, the
innovation consequences of competition policy interventions that challenge the exclusionary
conduct of dominant firms depend importantly on the direction of the strategic response of
dominant firms and their rivals to each other’s R&D investments. Enforcement actions that
challenge pre-innovation exclusion and enforcement actions that challenge post-innovation
exclusion will tend to be effective in different strategic settings. In addition, a competition policy
intervention that prevents dominant firms from excluding innovation rivals by raising their R&D
costs will necessarily increase rival investment, and will increase dominant firm investment if
and only if the dominant firm regards rival investment as a strategic complement. These results
are relevant to the antitrust evaluation of a dominant firm’s “appropriability” justification for
exclusionary practices: its claim that those practices will benefit innovation by increasing its own
reward for innovation success and, thus, encouraging it to invest more in R&D (Baker (2016)).
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Appendix
PROPOSITION 1: An increase in z shifts ρ1 in the direction of higher I1 if and only if –V11z/
V111 > 0.
Proof. Firm 1’s reaction function I1 = ρ1(I2) is defined implicitly by first order condition
(1): V11 (I1, I2, z) = 0. If we assume that V11 (I1, I2, z) is continuous and differentiable,
then total differentiation of equation (1) yields V111 dI1 + V112 dI2 + V11z dz = 0. An
increase in z shifts ρ1 in the direction of higher I1 if and only if dI1/dz > 0, for dI2 = 0. If
dI2 = 0, then dI1/dz = –V11z/ V111. Hence dI1/dz > 0 if and only if –V11z/ V111. □
PROPOSITION 2: An increase in z shifts ρ2 in the direction of higher I2 if and only if –V22z/
V222 > 0.
Proof. Firm 2’s reaction function I2 = ρ2(I1) is defined implicitly by first order condition
(2): V22 (I2, I1, z) = 0. If we assume that V22 (I2, I1, z) is continuous and differentiable,
then total differentiation of equation (2) yields V221 dI1 + V222 dI2 + V22z dz = 0. An
increase in z shifts ρ2 in the direction of higher I2 if and only if dI2/dz > 0, for dI1 = 0. If
dI1 = 0, then dI2/dz = –V22z/ V222. Hence, dI2/dz > 0 if and only if –V22z/ V222 > 0. □
PROPOSITION 3: The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are increasing with marginal increases in z
if dI1/dz = [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/[V111V222 – V112V221 ] = [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/D > 0, and
dI2/dz = [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/[V111V222 – V112V221 ] = [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/D > 0.
Proof: The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are increasing with marginal increases in z if
dI1/dz if dI1/dz > 0 and dI2/dz > 0, respectively. The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are
defined by the simultaneous solution of the first-order conditions (1) and (2), on the
assumption that the second-order conditions hold. As indicated in the proofs of
Propositions 1 and 2, total differentiation of these conditions yields V111dI1 + V112dI2 +
V11zdz = 0 and V221dI + V222dI2 + V22zdz = 0. The simultaneous solution of these
equations implies dI1/dz = [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/D and dI2/dz = [–V22zV111 +
V221V11z]/D, where, by definition, D = [V111V222 – V112V221 ]. □
PROPOSITION 4: A policy intervention that raises z by a small amount will increase p if and
only if dp/dz = q11(1-q2) [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/D + q22(1-q1) [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/D > 0.
Proof: By definition, p(z) = q1(I1) + q2(I2) – q1(I1) q2(I2), with I1(z) and I2(z).
Differentiating with respect to z yields dp/dz = q11(1- q2) dI1/dz + q22 (1- q1) dI2/dz. By
Proposition 3, dI1/dz = [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/D and dI2/dz = [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/D.
Hence dp/dz = q11(1-q2) [–V11zV222 + V112V22z]/D + q22(1-q1) [–V22zV111 + V221V11z]/D. □
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PROPOSITION 5: The equilibrium level of I2 necessarily increases with marginal increases in
σ, and the equilibrium level of I1 increases with marginal increases in σ if and only if Δ > 0.
Proof: The equilibrium levels of I1 and I2 are increasing with marginal increases in σ if
and only if dI1/dσ > 0 and dI2/dσ > 0, respectively. In this problem, the objective
functions of the two firms are written V1 = q1(I1)(1-q2(I2))Π1sf + q1(I1)q2(I2)Π1ss(δ) + (1q1(I1))(1-q2(I2))Π1ff(θ) + (1-q1(I))q2(I2)Π1fs – C1(I1), and V2 = q2(I2)(1- q1(I1))Π2fs +
q2(I2) q1(I1)Π2ss(δ) + (1- q2(I2))(1- q1(I1))Π2ff(θ) + (1- q2(I2))q1(I1)Π2sf – C2(σ, I2). The
first order conditions that are solved simultaneously for I1(σ) and I2(σ) require V11 = 0 =
q11(1-q2)Π1sf + q11q2Π1ss – q12(1-q2)Π1ff – q11q2Π1fs – C11, and V22 = 0 = q22(1-q1)Π2fs +
q22q1Π2ss – q22(1-q1)Π2ff – q22q1Π2sf – C22 . Total differentiation of the first order
conditions implies V111dI1 + V112dI2 + V11σdσ = 0 and V221dI1 + V222dI2 + V22σdσ = 0,
which imply in turn that dI1/dσ = [V112V22σ]/D and dI2/dσ = [–V22σV111]/D, where, by
definition, D = [V111V222 – V112V221 ]. The expression dI2/dσ is necessarily positive
because V22σ = – Cσ2 > 0, V111 < 0, and D > 0. (If the reaction functions have opposite
signs, D is necessarily positive. If the reaction functions have the same sign, D is
positive by virtue of the assumption that the equilibrium is stable.) In the expression for
dI1/dσ, V2σ2 > 0 and D > 0, so dI1/dσ has the same sign as V112, which has the sign of Δ.□
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